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IN TBE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE P. CAMPBELL, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
PEARL STAGG, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15912 
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant claims that 
the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction prior to 
trial. Plaintiff contends the release was void or voidable 
because of the mutual mistake of the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court, sitting without a jury, found that the 
defendant's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of 
the accident giving rise to plaintiff's injuries and that 
the plaintiff was not negligent. The court thereupon awarded 
money judgment with interest and costs to the plaintiff. 
The court found that the release agreement entered into 
between the plaintiff and the defendant was voidable by the 
plaintiff on the basis of mutual mistake relating to the 
conditions that prevailed at the time the agreement was 
executed. 
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The court determined further that State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Company was not a necessary party to the action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the trial court's judgment 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant has selectively extracted and set forth 
facts from the record as if they were the only facts adduced 
at trial. The plaintiff does not consider as proper the 
defendant's use of editorial license in failing to account 
for all the salient facts germane to the trial court's 
decision. The eristical nature of the defendant's statement 
of facts tends to confuse and distort the factual foundation 
relied upon by the trial court in rendering its decision. 
The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred on 
September 9, 1973, approximately two miles west of Price on 
u.s. Highway 50-6 when the defendant turned her vehicle in 
front of the plaintiff's vehicle causing the collision in 
which the plaintiff sustained injuries and property damage. 
(R. 1-2). 
While still at the accident scene, the plaintiff 
noticed lumps beginning to form on his knee, right wrist and 
right elbow. (R. 122). At about the same time the plaintiff 
began to experience pain in his neck. (R. 122). The plaintiff 
was then transported by the police officer to Carbon Hospital 
where he was examined by Dr. Gorishek who ordered x-rays and 
performed a clinical examination upon the plaintiff. (R. 23). 
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Dr. Gorishek reached a diagnosis of cervical strain (Ex. 
39), and accordingly prescribed a muscle relaxant and pain 
reliever. ( R. 17). 
It was the doctor's opinion, on September 9, 1973, that 
the injury was minor and that it would best be treated by 
conservative care relying on the natural body functions to 
heal the injury. (R. 17-18). The doctor testified that he 
thought the condition would be cured within a month or two 
and that he had no reason, at that time, to suspect a hern-
iated disc at the C-5, C-6 level. (R. 18, 59). 
The plaintiff then left the emergency room, with the 
impression that he was not seriously hurt. (R. 123). 
Accordingly, the plaintiff arranged for substitute trans-
portation that evening and returned to work the following 
day. (R. 123). 
Mr. Campbell telephoned Mr. Lavell Brown, the State 
Farm adjustor on September 12, 1973, to make arrangements 
for transportation during the interim period while he was 
without a vehicle. (R. 125). During that phone conversation, 
Mr. Brown asked if Mr. Campbell had received any injuries in 
the accident and Mr. Campbell replied, "Well, no, I've had 
x-rays at the Hospital and on my neck, my right arm, up in 
the shoulder and down to the elbow, or below the elbow is 
sore, and my left wrist is a little sore and I had a little 
bump on my knee. That's about all." (Ex. 23, P• 3). 
On the basis of that conversation Mr. Brown concluded 
that Mr. Campbell had only a minor injury (T. 67) and thereupon 
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reported to his superiors that the injuries received by Mr. 
Campbell consisted of only "multiple bruises." (T. 68, Ex. 
2 4, 2 5) • 
Mr. Campbell went to see Dr. Gorishek again on September 
19, 1973. The doctor noted that his condition was "still 
about the same: soreness in his neck, mostly on the left." 
(T. 18). The doctor stated that he did not change his 
diagnosis or have any reason to suspect any additional 
injury than that observed on September 9, 1973. {T. 18). 
Accordingly, in response to Mr. Campbell's inquiry as to the 
seriousness of his injuries, the doctor stated that the 
healing "would take a little time, maybe a month or two." 
(T. 125). The doctor then attempted to alleviate some of 
the discomfort during that time by prescribing a cervical 
collar. (Ex. 3, T. 45, 46, 124). The doctor summarized his 
perception by stating that he knew Mr. Campbell had an 
injury to his neck, but at that time thought it was a minor 
strain. The exact nature of the injury was unknown to him. 
( T. 60). 
Two days after his visit to Dr. Gorishek on September 
21, 1973, Mr. Campbell met with Mr. Brown, the State Farm 
adjustor. Mr. Campbell stated that at that time he relied 
on Dr. Gorishek's representations that his injuries were not 
serious and that he was going to get better in a month or 
two. ( T. 126). In the course of the negotiations, Mr· 
Brown stated that the company would pay $850.00 for the 
damage to the car, $400.00 for pain, suffering and injury 
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and would give an open ended medical and lost wage settle-
ment with a specified upper limit. Mr. Campbell signed the 
release that evening. (T. 75-84). 
Mr. Brown stated that at the time of the settlement 
that Mr. Campbell advised him that he was okay other than a 
slight pain in the neck. (T. 76). 
The parties decided on an open release form as compared 
to a set amount form because both parties knew that Mr. 
Campbell was still seeing the doctor and that complete 
healing of the injury, according to Dr. Gorishek, would 
take one to two months. (R. 524, T. 76, 77). 
Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Campbell indicated that their 
settlement was based on the existence of a minor injury that 
would be cured within a relatively short time. (T. 101, 
126, 127, 76, 77). The doctor's report obtained by Mr. 
Brown from Dr. Gorishek (Ex. 52) on September 28, 1977, led 
Mr. Brown to conclude that there would be no permanent 
physical impairment. (T. 82-83). 
Mr. Campbell visited Dr. Gorishek again on September 
26, 1973, because he was beginning to experience more dis-
comfort in his neck. (T. 129). The doctor felt no need to 
change his diagnosis at this time. The doctor prescribed 
another cervical collar and injected xylocaine and cortisone 
to relieve some of the muscle strain and soreness in his 
19 45 46) The doctor at that time felt neck. (Ex. 3, T. , , • 
that Mr. Campbell's pain and discomfort was caused by arthri-
tis aggravated by trauma. (T. 47-8). 
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The doctor saw Mr. Campbell again on October 30, 1973, 
and concluded that the findings were still about the same. 
( T. 20). 
On November 13, 1973, Mr. Campbell's condition had 
significantly deteriorated as evidenced by his complaints of 
soreness in the arm. (T. 49). The doctor continued treat-
ment with mild sedation for pain. (T. 20). It was at this 
time that Dr. Gorishek suggested that Mr. Campbell be 
examined by Dr. Robert H. Lamb, an orthopedic surgeon. (T. 
20). 
Dr. Lamb saw Mr. Campbell on November 30, 1973, in the 
Carbon Hospital. (T. 129). Dr. Lamb concluded after the 
examination that arrangements should be made to admit Mr. 
Campbell to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City. (T. 21). 
On December 7, 1973, before Mr. Campbell's admission to St. 
Mark's Hospital, Dr. Lamb sent a letter to Dr. Gorishek 
indicating his diagnosis of nerve root pressure in the 
cervical spine. (T. 50). 
Mr. Campbell was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital on 
December 19, 1973, for what he thought to be an exploratory 
examination. (T. 129). While at St. Mark's, Mr. Campbell 
was observed by Dr. Dennis Thoen, a neurologist. (T. 177). 
After conducting a neurological examination which included 
an electromyography, Dr. Thoen concluded on December 21, 
1973, that Mr. Campbell "was suffering from a herniated 
cervical disc with compression of nerve roots C-5, possibly 
C-6." (T. 179). The doctor continued conservative treatment 
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and released Mr. Campbell from the hospital on January 4, 
1974. (T. 130). 
On February 14, 1974, Mr. Campbell, by letter, notified 
Mrs. Stagg through her agent, State Farm Muta! Insurance 
Company of his decision to rescind the settlement agreement 
and accordingly tendered a cashier's check in the amount of 
$1,250.00 representing an estimate of the amount of money 
paid by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company pursuant to the 
release agreement. (T. 170, Ex. 34). 
Contemporaneously with the recission and tender made by 
Mr. Campbell and subsequent thereto, State Farm paid Mr. 
Campbell and his creditors for medical expenses and lost 
wages. (Ex. 68). The payments made by State Farm were 
made directly to Mr. Campbell and his creditors and were not 
made through Mr. Campbell's attorney. (Ex. 68). All payments 
made thereafter by State Farm were made knowing that Mr. 
Campbell intended to rescind the agreement. 
The plaintiff's complaint was then served on the defendant 
on February 24, 1974. (R. 1-4). The defendant answered on 
March 15, 1974. (R. 5-8). 
From January 4, 1974, through the last of August, 1974, 
Mr. Campbell's condition worsened and became in his words, 
"unbearable." (T. 132). He experienced extreme pain in his 
arms, head, neck and shoulders. (T. 130-2). The doctors 
concluded that he should be hospitalized for further evaluation 
and treatment. Mr. Campbell was readmitted to St. Mark's 
Hospital on September 4, 1974, and was re-examined by Dr. 
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Thoen who conducted another electromyogram. (T. 180). The 
doctor concluded from his examination that "there had been 
no improvement in his C-6 radiculopathy" and that "his EMG 
was unchanged." (T. 180). The doctor recommended disectomy 
and fusion as the only reasonable means of relieving Mr. 
Campbell's symptoms. (T.181). The operation was unsuccessful 
from a technical standpoint, and Mr. Campbell's condition 
continued to deteriorate. (T. 134, 135, 182). 
Dr. Thoen saw Mr. Campbell again in May of 1977 and 
from the examination concluded that Mr. Campbell had "a 
thoracic outlet syndrome, that is the irritation of the 
nerve bundle that runs from the neck down into the arm." 
(T.184). Dr. Thoen contrasted his diagnosis with Dr. Gorishek's 
diagnosis of cervical strain as follows: 
Q. Could the herniated disc itself, could 
the fact or the truth of a herniated disc, 
together with the fact or the truth of 
brachial plexus syndrom or thoraic 
outlet syndrome be masked or hidden behind 
the general symptoms of a cervical strain? 
A. • •• I'd say that any herniated disc, 
thoracic outlet syndrome that may result 
from a hyper extension injury would initially 
present itself as a cervical strain and would 
be almost impossible to distinguish one from 
the other unless one were a neurologist and 
examined the patient. Neurology may do it 
but even the average orthopedist I think would 
have great difficulty doing so. 
(T. 190). Dr. Thoen concluded that ••• "Dr. Gorishek may 
have known the patient had the numbness [in his hands] but 
may have been unaware of the significance of the numbness. • 
(T.190). 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The case was set for trial on October 3, 1977, at which 
time the plaintiff tendered $4,124.58 plus interest in the 
amount of $1,332.70 to the defendant pursuant to U.C.A. 78-
27-1 and 3. (R. 104). 
The defendant, on the first day of the first trial and 
after the case had been pending for over three years, informed 
the court that the case could not proceed to trial until the 
proper parties were named. The Court denied the motion. 
(Minute Entry dated October 3, 1977, found seven pages after 
R. 536). Judge Sheya sat without a jury on the first trial 
and then took the matter under advisement. He subsequently 
passed away before he rendered his decision, and the action 
was then transferred to Judge Bennell who reset it for trial 
on February 23, 1978. The only other reference to an objec-
tion on the basis of failure to join an indispensable party 
appears in the form of an "Objection to Trial" which was 
submitted by the defendant on January 18, 1978, approx-
imately 30 days before the second trial. (R. 220). By the 
rules of the court, the motion was not scheduled for hearing 
until the date of trial at which time the court denied the 
defendant's motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATE FRAM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE 
PARTY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE RELEASE BETWEEN 
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT. 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. The respondent did not enter into a release agreement 
with the appellant's insurance company and, therefore, the company 
has no independent standing as a party in this action. 
The appellant's argument that State Farm is an indispensable 
party in this action is indeed enigmatic. The argument is 
premised on the allegation that the respondent entered into 
a release contract with appellant and with appellant's 
insurance company. (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). It is with 
this premise that the respondent first takes issue. 
The language of the release agreement is fully set out 
in the Record. ( R. 7}. 
In essence, the agreement requires Mr. Campbell to 
release all persons from any claims, demands, etc. arising 
from the accident in question in return for the consideration 
outlined in the agreement. This peculiar drafting of the 
release agreement requires a litigant to sort through all 
the legal entities that could be referred to in the release 
to garner the real parties to the contract. The respondent 
is unable to understand the rationale underlying the 
appellant's argument that of all possible parties named in 
the release, the insurance company should not only be joined 
but joined as an indispensable party. At the time of the 
execution of the release, possible claims existed against 
the manufacturer and servicer of defendant's auto which 
allegedly experienced brake malfunction, the state department 
of transportation who maintained the highway and certain 
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medical persons, who treated the plaintiff. When the 
complaint was filed, did all these parties who were unnamed 
in the complaint have a right to be manditorily joined as 
indispensible parties? Of course not. The plaintiff's 
choice of defendants precluded them from any possible lia-
bility and thus from any legitimate right to be involved in 
this litigation. 
The respondent fails to see how the appellant's position 
for mandatory joinder of the insurance company is even as 
well-founded as a motion to join other possible defendants 
to this action on the same theory. As compared to the other 
possible defendants, Mr. Campbell had acquired no cause of 
action against the insurance company as a result of the 
accident. The fact that the accident produced no direct 
liability on the part of the insurance company is a clear 
illustration of the rationale demonstrating the company's 
dispensability in this action. The appellant, undaunted, 
realizing that she is precluded from demonstrating the 
vulnerability of the insurance company as a defendant on the 
basis of liability, now attempts to procure the status of a 
defendant for the company by use of 1) the execution of the 
release agreement or 2) the existence of the insurance 
contract signed with Mrs. Stagg. 
As to the first area, the execution of the release, it 
must be conceded that the insurance company cannot acquire 
liability or interest in this action by Mr. Campbell's 
release of the insurance company in the agreement. If the 
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insurance company had no liability before the signing of the 
agreement, it had none after. If that were not true, the 
whole world would become necessary parties to this action 
simply on the basis of their inclusion as a group in the 
release. 
Following from that premise, the release of the insurance 
company becomes a nullity because Mr. Campbell had no cause 
of action against the company to release. It has long been 
held that the surrender of or forebearance to assert an 
invalid claim or defense will not constitute consideration 
for a contract. Huberdeau v. Desmarais, 79 Wash. 2d 432, 
486 P.2d 1074 (1971); 17 Am. Jr. Contracts, §111. Aside 
from the release of the non-existant liability, the only 
other consideration supporting the release agreement is the 
money paid by the insurance company pursuant to the insurance 
contract between the company and Mrs. Stagg. 
It cannot be denied that State Farm was obligated to 
Mrs. Stagg by its insurance contract to both defend and pay 
the claims asserted against her. The insurance company's 
agent admitted that he negotiated the agreement for and on 
behalf of the Staggs by reason of his agency with the 
insurance company. (T. 74). The insurance company cannot 
now claim that the money paid on behalf of Mrs. Stagg is to 
be interpreted as the consideration supporting the company's 
independent right to become a party to this action. It is 
an elementary principal of law that an agreement to do or 
the doing of that which a person is already bound to do does 
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not constitute sufficient consideration for a · new promise. 
Van Tassell v. Lewis, 118 Utah 356, 222 P.2d 350 (1950); 
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah, 1974); Apperson v. 
Security State Bank, 215 Kan. 724, 528 P.2d 1211 (1974). 
The insurance company is involved here only because it 
is an indemnitor of Mrs. Stagg, and the Company, outside of 
that relationship, has no cognizable right or interest in 
this litigation. The money was paid by the company because 
of an independent contractual obligation which cannot by 
itself, support the insurance company's own independent 
standing as a party to the contract. 
As set out above, the insurance company is an indemnitor 
and the right of an indemnitor or a party affected by the 
possible outcome of litigation does not extend to being joined 
as an indispensable party. See cases at 59 Am. Jur. Parties, 
§149. The respondent has failed both to find a case where 
an insurance company was joined as an indispensable party in 
this type of case or even a case where a similar motion was 
made. The closest analogy seems to be the line of cases 
where the insurance company moved to intervene as opposed to 
being joined as an indispensable party under Federal Rule 
24(a) (2) which is almost exactly identical to U.R.C.P. 
24( a) ( 2). 
Kelly v. Pascal System, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 755 (D.C. 
Ky., 1960), was a case in which the insurance company was 
denied the right to intervene in an action brought against 
its insured, in order to determine whether it might rely on 
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certain defenses in the insurance policy to any claim made 
against it by the defendant insured. The Court stated that 
under Federal Rule 24(a) (2), "a party is bound by the judgment 
only when he may be subject to a plea of res judicata," and 
that, consequently, the insurer had no right to intervene 
under the rule. It added that the liability of the insurance 
company was "only potential and may never arise even though 
the liability of the insured is fixed in this action." 
Kelly, supra at 778. See also Slusarski v. United States Lines 
Co., 28 FRD 338 (D.C. Pa., 1961); Lesser v. West Albany Ware-
houses, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 461, 191 N.Y.S. 2d 113 (1959); 84 
ALR 2d 14l(c), 1414, §34[b]; 44 Am.Jur. 2d Insurance, §1526. 
State Farm would be subject to all these attacks if it had 
moved to join. It would be ironical if the company, in this 
action, could gain indirectly that which it could not obtain 
directly. 
Another line of analogous cases reveals that a third 
party does not become indispensable to an action to terminate 
a contract simply because its rights under an entirely 
separate contract will be seriously affected by the termin-
ation. Midland National Bank v. Cousins Properties, Inc., 
69 FRD 42 (N.D. Ga., 1975). Likewise, State Farm does not 
have an interest in this litigation because of its interests 
in an insurance contract with Mrs. Stagg. Moore, in his 
commentary states that: 
Although the setting aside of a lease would 
make impossible the performance of a contract 
between the lessee and another, it was held 
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that the thir~ ~erson was only a proper party 
and.co~ld be J~l~ed or not at the option of the 
pla1nt1ff. [c1t1ng cases]. Similarly, in a suit 
by A to declare its obligations under a contract 
with B as terminated, C, whose obligations to 
B under another contract and who will be affected 
by the status of A's obligations is not an 
indispensable party [citing cas~s]. 
3A Moore's Federal Practice §19.10. See also 59 Am.Jur. 
Parties, §149, to the effect that the indemnitor must seek 
intervention and that even then the right to intervene has 
been denied an indemnitor. 
The appellant's brief is premised entirely on the 
existence of a contract of release. It seems axiomatic 
that if the contract of release fails, the theories of the 
appellant in this regard likewise must fail. 
B. State Farm's actual representation in this case obviates 
any claim of indispensability. 
The facts of the case clearly illustrate that State 
Farm's interests have been represented throughout this 
action. It was admitted at the first trial of this matter 
that Mrs. Stagg has, at all times, been represented by Ray 
H. Ivie who is the attorney for State Farm in the Central 
Utah area. It was also admitted that Mr. Ivie has been 
retained by State Farm to represent Mrs. Stagg and that his 
bill for defending Mrs. Stagg in this action has or will be 
paid by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. (Supplemental 
Record pp. 1-4). 
Finally, the respondent took the deposition of Mr. 
Lavell Brown, the state Farm Mutual Insurance Company's 
representative, and the respondent's theory concerning the 
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case should have been readily apparent to the insurance 
company from the questions propounded to Mr. Brown. (T. 75-
77). 
Despite these facts, State Farm has made no effort to 
enter this action by the means available under Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It seems only logical 
that if the insurance company, an experienced litigator, 
thought that it's interests were inadequately represented 
by Mr. Ivie, the company should have sought intervention 
with other counsel. Instead, the appellant, as if in 
pursuit of a deliberate plan to invite the Court into error, 
has allowed the case to go to trial twice without effectually 
raising the defense until the first day of each trial. The 
appellant by such action, has undeniably created the circum-
stances comprising what she conceives as error and yet 
complains of the results. Such a trial tactic ought not to 
be countenanced by the Court. 
It would be incongruous if the insurance company could, 
by its manipulations, get two bites out of the cherry. 
First it sets up a strawrnan in the form of itself by claiming 
through its insured that it is a necessary party, which, had 
it really so believed, it could have been resolved by a 
timely motion to intervene. It is obvious that the company 
intended to invite the court into error so that if it lost 
d l.t would have a basis for appeal. on liability or amages, 
It is inconceivable that Mrs. Stagg dreamed up this legal 
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conundrum unbeknown to State Farm. This procedure, there-
fore, is close to a fraud upon the court. 
C. The two trial court judges properly determined that 
appellant's insurance company was not an indispensable party 
to this action. 
The appellant, informed the court on the first day of 
trial and after the case had been pending for over three 
years, that she thought State Farm was an indispensable 
party. The Court denied the Motion. (Minute Entry dated 
October 3, 1977, found seven pages after R. 536). 
The appellant, then, approximately 30 days before the 
second trial, submitted an "Objection to Trial" to Judge 
Bunnell which was based on the failure to join an indispensable 
party. (R. 220). This motion was not noticed for hearing by 
the attorney for appellant and therefore, was not heard 
until trial. Rules 4 and 5 of the Seventh Judicial District. 
Rule 12(h) U.R.C.P. states that when the defense of 
failure to join an indispensable party is made at trial, the 
motion is to be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) "in 
light of any evidence that may have been received." The 
procedure employed by the appellant in making the motion was 
tantamount to presenting the motion on the first day of 
trial because of appellant's failure to notice the motion 
for hearing prior to trial. 
Rule 15(b) u.R.C.P., independent of Rule 12(h), requires 
that issues not raised by the pleadings be determined on the 
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basis of the evidence presented. The record in this case 
reveals that no evidence was introduced before the trial 
court by the appellant substantiating State Farm's 
indispensability nor does the appellant suggest any evidence 
that went to that issue. In fact, the trial court, as part 
of its findings of fact, concluded that State Farm was not 
an indispensable or necessary party to the action. (R. 
527). 
The Court in Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), dealt 
with a similar case and stated the following: 
The trial court properly refused to dismiss 
the action when defendants asserted, for 
the first time, the defense of failure to 
join an indispensable party, at the trial 
on the merits. Under Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P., 
when this defense is asserted at trial, it 
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 
15(b), in the light of any evidence that may 
have been received. At the trial, defendants 
did not adduce evidence sufficient to establish 
and identify an interest on the part of the 
alleged "indispensable party," so as to 
require joinder under Rule 19(a), U.R.C.P. 
Papanikolas, supra, at 1258. 
It is important to recognize that the only conceivable 
interest of the insurance company in this case stems from 
the execution of the release agreement. Yet the issue of 
the release was raised in this case by the appellant in the 
form of an affirmative defense. (R. 91-94). Having plead 
the execution of the release as an affirmative defense, the 
appellant thereby assumes the burden of bringing forth the 
evidence and establishing its validity. 66 Am.Jur. Release 
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§45. The respondent's case does not necessitate the 
appearance of State Farm as a separately named party. It is 
the appellant's plea of the affirmative defense that is 
responsible for what the appellant claims will jeopardize 
the insurance company's interest. Certainly, the duty of 
adding and dropping parties as it becomes apparent that the 
defendant will rely at trial on a deed, contract, promissory 
note or other document does not rest on the plaintiff, but 
instead, rests on the party infusing the new issue into the 
case. 
The appellant essentially admits these arguments. The 
appellant uses a quotation from Houser v. Smith, 19 Utah 
150, 56 P. 683, 685 (1899), which states: 
Courts have no right to dispose of and adjudicate 
upon property rights of persons not parties 
to the case and strangers to the record, and 
a judgment rendered against persons not parties 
to the action, and over whom the court acquired 
no jurisdiction, is absolutely void as to them. 
(Appellant's Brief, P. 17). The appellant characterizes the 
case as standing for the proposition that if the court 
adjudicates the property rights of persons not parties and 
strangers to the record, they are not bound by the judgment. 
The question then arises that if the adjudication of the 
court in this matter is, according to the appellant's 
argument, not binding on the insurance company because they 
are not parties and are strangers to the record, where is 
the merit in appellant's argument that the company's interests 
are jeopardized and thus the company is indispensable. The 
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appellant must either contend that the insurance 
company 
is a stranger to this action and thus unaffected by it or 
admit that it is represented in some fashion and thus 
assume the burden to intervene if it feels the representation 
is inadequate. 
The respondent does not seek judgment against State 
Farm, nor does the respondent rely on a judgment that is 
binding on State Farm to execute against Mrs. Stagg and, 
therefore, any issues of indemnity between State Farm and 
Mrs. Stagg are totally separable from the issues involved 
between the present parties in this action and can be separ-
ately determined. Shields v. Barrow, 17 H. 411 (1854); 
(Appellant's Brief pp. 16-17). 
The only authentic reason advocated by the appellant 
for State Farm's joinder is the need to bind the insurance 
company to the judgment in order to allow Mrs. Stagg to seek 
indemnification from the company for any loss. 
Since the appellant's argument is generated by Mrs. 
Stagg's concern that she be indemnified, Rule 14 U.R.C.P. 
provides the proper remedy. It states: 
At any time after commencement of the action 
a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, 
may cause a summons and complaint to be served 
upon a person not a party to the action who is 
or may be liable to him for all or part of . 
the plaintiff's claim against him. (Emphasis added) 
The burden is cast on the appellant, under this rule, to 
bring the insurance company, as an indemnitor, into the 
action. After all, it is only in the capacity of an indemnitor 
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that State Farm has any interest at all in this action. 
Since the respondent does not require judgment against 
the insurance company to execute against Mrs. Stagg and 
since the appellant contends that any judgment is void as to 
the insurance company, Houser, supra and Appellant's Brief, 
p. 16-17, then it follows that Mrs. Stagg is the only person 
who needs or wants to bind State Farm to any judgment. 
This concern of the appellant is beyond any conceivable 
duty of the plaintiff to remedy. 
D. An insurance company should not be joined in a suit 
involving both tort and contract. 
The Court in Armijo v. Ward Transport, 302 P.2d 517 
(Colo. 1956) dealt with an action for injuries received 
in an automobile-truck collision in which the plaintiffs 
not only joined the truck owner and driver as defendants but 
also the truck owner's insurer and its adjuster. The district 
court sustained the insurer's and its adjuster's motions to 
dismiss the action as to them. 
The Supreme Court held that the parties who were dismissed 
"were not essential or necessary parties to a proper adjudica-
tion of the claims of the plaintiffs." Armijo, supra, at 
518. The Court reasoned as follows: 
Plaintiff's counsel attempt to do by 
indirection that which they cannot do 
directly. we have held that in an or~inary 
action for damages the insurance carrier 
cannot be joined in the suit. Crowley 
v. Hardman Bros., 122 Colo, 489, 223 
P.2d 1045; Wheat v. Fidelity & Cas. C~., 
128 Colo, 236, 261 P. 2d 493. Such being. 
the law in this state the insurance carrier 
cannot be made a party defendant to the 
action for damages and to set aside.a release 
when it was not named as a release in the 
instrument. 
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Arimjo, supra at 518. 
The Court relied on Ferris v. Atlantic, 194 N.C. 653, 
140 S.E. 607 where the Court distinguished cases that 
alleged a conspiracy on the part of the insurance company, 
its agents and other defendants involving fraud. The Court 
held that absent a complaint of fraud, the plaintiff had no 
right to have the insurance company or its agents joined. 
Arimjo, supra at 519. 
The only case cited by the appellant is Pattison v. Highway 
Insurance Underwriters, 278 s.w. 2d 207 (Tex. 1954). In 
that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the insurance company 
through its agents had falsely and fraudulently misrepresented 
the coverage of the insurance contract and had thus induced 
the plaintiffs into a settlement agreement. Pattison, supra 
at 209. The Court stated the general rules as follows: 
The policy of insurance here involved is 
written on a standard Texas automobile 
insurance form. It is now well settled 
that a suit by an injured person against 
the insurance company before he has obtained 
final judgment against the insured is 
prematurely brought; and it is further well 
settled that a suit by the injured person 
against the insurer in the same suit in which 
he attempts to fix the liability of the 
insured is abatable. Seaton v. Pickens, 
Tex.Com. App., 126 Tex. 271, 87 S.W.2d 709, 
106 A.L.R. 512; Bluth v. Neeson, 127 Tex. 
462, 94 S.W.2d 407; Bransford v. Pageway 
Coaches 129 Tex. 327, 104 S.W.2d 471. It 
is ordi~arily reversible error in a sui~ t~ 
recover for personal injuries for a plaintiff 
to get before the jury inf~rmation that th: 
defendant is protected by insurance. Barrington 
v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462. 
Pattison, supra at 210. 
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The Court, followed the rule previously set out that 
since fraudulent conduct was alleged, the insurance company 
was a proper party to the action. There are no allegations 
in the present case of fraud or misconduct on the part of 
the defendant or her insurance company and, therefore, the 
insurance company has no right to be joined. 
The Court in Christensen v. Peterson, 483 P.2d 447 
(Utah 1971), held that an insurer could not be properly 
joined as a party defendant with a tort-feasor. See also, 
Young v. Barney, 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965); 
Holt v. Bell, 392 P.2d 361 (Okl., 1964). 
The Utah Court in Christensen, supra endorsed the 
holding of Lloyds' of London v. Blair, 262 F.2d 211 (C.A. 
10, 1958) where the Court observed that the plaintiff had 
improperly joined two causes of action. "One sounded in 
tort, and no contractual right or liability was involved. 
The other was against a group of insurance carriers; the 
liability asserted was solely and exclusively contractual. 
No liability in the nature of a tort committed by the 
insurance company was involved." Christensen, supra at 448. 
The Court held: 
• • • The two causes of action were separate 
and distinct with entirely different bases 
in law. No single party defendant was liable 
both as a tort feasor and as contractual obligee 
for the payment of compensation under an in-
surance agreement. And the issues as between 
plaintiffs and the United States o~ one hand, 
and as between plaintiffs and the 1ns~ranc7 
carriers on the other hand, were not 1dent1cal. 
Lloyds, supra at 214. 
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The Court concluded that there was nothing in the Rules 
of Civil Procedure or their historical background which 
would lend support to the view that it was intended or 
purposed that a suit against insurance carriers for the 
enforcement of a contractual obligation contained in a 
policy of insurance could be joined with an action against 
the United States under the Tort Claims Act." Accordingly, 
the Court held that "the motion to dismiss the defendant 
insurance companies should have been granted without 
prejudice." Christensen, supra at 448. 
The Court in Young, supra in commenting on Rule 20 
U.R.C.P. stated that: 
First, it will be noted that the rule is 
permissive. Second, it is generally held 
that it is not proper to join an action such 
as the primary one here, which is based 
on negligence, and therefore, in tort, with 
one like the claimed supplemental action, which 
would be in contract and thus based upon a claim 
of an entirely different character. 
Young, supra at 848. 
This case likewise presents clearly distinguishable 
issues. The issues between the plaintiff and defendant are 
entirely separate from the issues involved between Mrs. Stagg 
and her insurance company. The trial Court in this action 
properly recognized that: 
There is only one tort-feasor, 
the defendant, and any liability on the 
part of State Farm Fire ~ C~s~alty Company 
is contingent upon the 11ab1l1ty of the 
defendant as provided in the insurance contract 
between defendant and State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Company and, therefore, the Court finds that the 
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plaintiff would not have to joint State Farm 
& Casualty Company as a necessary party in order 
to proceed with this action even though the 
release in question released both the defendant 
of her primary liability and State Farm of any 
contingent liability. (R.505). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS A 
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND LAVELL 
BROWN AS TO THE NATURE OF THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFF, 
EUGENE CAMPBELL. 
A. In equity, the Court may only reverse the findings of 
fact entered by the lower court if the evidence clearly 
Preponderates against such findings. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently ruled on the issue 
in Provo City v. Lambert, 574 P.2d 727 (Utah, 1978). The 
Court held that the facts entered by the lower court will 
only be disturbed if the evidence clearly preponderates 
against those findings. See also, Boz-Lew Builders v. Smith, 
571 P.2d 389 (Mont. 1977). 
The Utah Court in Kier v. Condract, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 
P.2d 327 (1970), stated that the Supreme Court will review 
the facts in a case in equity, but will do so in light of 
the evidence as believed by the trial court and not 
necessarily as urged upon it from the point of view of the 
appellants. 
The trial court in this case found that: 
The diagnosis of Dr. Gorishek at the time of the 
accident to the effect that any injury to the 
neck was slight, not serious, and would be healed 
in a month or two, becomes immaterial to the 
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questions unless the diagnosis of neck injury 
was known to the plaintiff and Mr. Brown at the time 
the release was executed. The evidence discloses 
the.following facts regarding the plaintiff 
dur7ng the crucial period between the time of the 
accident and the execution of the release: 
som~ discomfo:t in the neck region following the 
acci~ent, bruises and swelling in other parts 
of his body, a prescription for pain pills and a 
com~unication for the doctor on the day of the 
accident that his injuries were slight and that 
he would be better in a month or two. 
He returned to work at his job on a construction 
site and continued to work throughout this period. 
He visited the doctor 10 days after the accident 
with the same symptoms present and the doctor 
prescribed a neck collar, more pills and there 
was no further communication from the doctor to the 
plaintiff relative to the nature of his injuries. 
The plaintiff knew that there was something wrong 
with his neck, but there is no evidence that 
he knew what was the nature of the injury. The 
plaintiff contacted Mr. Brown primarily concerned 
about getting transportation so he could get back 
and forth to work (some 35 miles one way). The 
release was signed 12 days after the accident on 
September 21st Mr. Brown appeared at the 
meeting where the release was signed with no medical 
reports except the statements made to him by the 
plaintiff to the effect that there was no serious 
injuries. (Exhibits 23, 24 & 25). He did observe 
that plaintiff was wearing a neck collar. The Court, 
therefore, finds that there was a mutual mistake 
of fact as to the nature of plaintiff's injuries 
and that the release was voidable. (R. 504-5, 526-7). 
B. A release will be set aside when, at the time of its 
execution both parties were laboring under a mutual mistake as 
to the existence, nature or extent of the injuries suffered by 
the releaser. 
The law in Utah as it applies to setting aside a release 
of a claim for personal injuries is clearly set out in 
Reynolds v. Merril, 23 Utah 2d 155, 460 P.2d 323 (1969), 
which was followed and reaffirmed in the recent case of 
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Carter v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005 (Utah, 1976). The Supreme 
Court in overturning the trial court's summary judgment 
in Reynolds, supra, which dismissed the plaintiff's 
complaint said: 
We are not here concerned with the question 
of when the plaintiff's disc was herniated. 
He has alleged that it resulted from the 
accident. If he can prove it, and that at 
the time of.signing the release neither party 
knew about it, he should have that privilege. 
Reynolds, at 159. 
The pivotal question of fact in a decision to set 
aside a release of a claim for personal injuries due to a 
mutual mistake regarding the injury to the releaser, is to 
"distinguish between an unknown injury and unknown conse-
quences of a known injury." Reynolds, supra, at 156. (Original 
emphasis). See, also 71 A.L.R. 2d 82, 105 Section 5(b) and 
Later Case Service. The Utah Courts have firmly adopted the 
position that a mutual mistake as to the existence, nature 
or extent of an injury will support setting aside a release, 
while a mistake as to the consequences of an injury, the 
nature and extent of which are known, is simply a mistake of 
opinion and are not grounds to set aside a release. Reynolds, 
supra at 156, 157. 
It is important at the outset to know that the language 
of the release is not significant with regard to unknown 
injuries. Reynolds, supra favorably quotes following language 
from Pirchgestner v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R. Co., 118 
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Utah 20, 28-29, 219 P.2d 685, 690, (1950), (reversed on 
other grounds): 
The defendant argued that even if the parties 
were mutually mistaken with respect to the 
nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries, 
such mistake is immaterial because the plaintiff 
by the release, discharged all claims and causes 
of action which he then had or might thereafter 
have or claim on account of any and all personal 
injuries whether known or unknown, apparent 
or unapparent, including complications arising 
from personal injuries, and that the very basics 
of the release was that the parties might be 
wholly mistaken as to the nature and extent of 
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. However 
logical the defendants argument may seem, the 
authorities are to the contrary. Because a 
release is as all-inclusive in its terms as 
legal ingenuity can make it and purports to 
release all possible claims arising out of an 
accident and is understood as such by the release 
for, it will nevertheless be set aside when 
it can be shown that at the time of its execution 
both parties were laboring under a mutual mistake 
as to the extent of the injuries suffered by 
the releasor. (Citations Omitted). Reynolds, 
supra at 157. 
Further, the Supreme Court favorably quoted from 
Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747, 751 (1967), 
stating that the majority view, which Utah adopts, 
•.• permits a releasor to avoid release 
where unknown injuries existed at the 
time the release was executed though the 
release invaribly is broad enough to 
encompass unforseen injuries and though 
the release was honestly obtained without 
fraud, over-reaching or undue influence 
on the part of the releasee. 
Ranta, supra at 421 P.2d 751. 
The issue in the instant case is: Did plaintiff and 
the agent for the defendant's insurer execute the "Agreement 
and Release" while laboring under a mutual mistake as to the 
-28-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
existence, nature or extent of the plaintiffs injuries. 
Comparing the facts of the instant case to those of Reynolds, 
supra, and of Carter, supra, will assist in the making of 
that determination. 
In Reynolds, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile 
accident and immediately contacted his physician. Reynolds 
was treated for the pains and symptoms which specifically 
included pain in his neck. Reynolds, supra at 155. Thus, 
plaintiff specifically knew his neck had been injured and 
had been treated specifically for the injury to his neck for 
over three months prior to the signing of the release. 
Then, after continuing in increasingly severe pain Reynolds 
was finally referred by his personal physician to a specialist 
who diagnosed the problem as a herniated disc. Reynolds, 
supra at 156. A spinal fusion was performed, resulting in 
a permanent partial disability. Reynolds, supra at 156. 
The trial court held, essentially, that if Reynolds 
knew his neck was injured, and if he was seeing a doctor for 
the injury to his neck; and if he knew his condition was not 
healed when he signed the release more than three months 
after the accident, then he was, therefore, not laboring 
under a mistake of fact as to his injuries and the release 
was not voidable. Reynolds, supra at 156, 159. For these 
reasons, the trial court entered summary judgment for the 
defendant. Reynolds, supra at 156. 
The supreme Court held that while plaintiff may have 
known his neck was injured and not yet healed when he signed 
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the release, if he and the agent did not know the true 
nature of his injury, i.e., that he had a herniated disc, 
there would be a mutual mistake sufficient to set aside the 
release. Reynolds, supra at 159. The Supreme Court set 
aside the summary judgment to give the plaintiff an oppor-
tunity to prove that he had a herniated disc, that it was 
the result of the accident and that he did not know he had a 
herniated disc at the time of the release. Reynolds, supra 
at 159. 
The case of Carter v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005 (Utah, 
1976), affirmed Reynolds as the law of Utah regarding 
releases. Carter supra at 1006. The facts of Carter are as 
follows: Mrs. Carter, the plaintiff was involved in a 
collision with the defendant. On the day of the accident 
her doctor diagnosed her injuries as "cervical contusions" 
or cervical strain, strain of the left shoulder and superficial 
abrasions. Her x-rays at this time showed degenerative disc 
disease at C-5/6. The next day she was hospitalized and 
remained hospitalized for five and one-half weeks. Approxi-
mately three months after the accident, while still under 
her doctors care, Mrs. Carter signed a release. Over four 
years after the accident and over three and one-half years 
after the release was signed, Mrs. Carter was again hospital-
ized and a herniated disc was discovered and a fusion performed. 
Carter, supra at 1005-1006. 
The Court in Carter upheld the plaintiffs release and 
indicated that the distinguishing fact between Reynolds and 
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Carter was that in Reynolds " ••. the injury was not noted 
and not considered in its true light at the time," while in 
Carter it was. Justice Crockett, in his concurring opinion 
in Carter, put it this way: 
At the time of the settlement [of Carter] 
both parties knew that the plaintiff had a 
serious injury to the cervical area of her 
back. She had been in the hospital for 
over five weeks under medical care with the 
use of the hospital diagnostic facilities 
including the taking of x-rays. (emphasis 
added). 
Carter, supra at 1007. 
Justice Crockett specifically noted the fact that "the 
x-rays showed 'a slight degenerative disease' of her cervical 
vertebra". Carter, supra at 1008. 
The facts of the instant case are fully set forth in 
the statement of facts. But generally, it is undisputed 
that Mr. Campbell, was informed by his physician, Dr. Gorishek, 
that he had minor injuries - essentially bruises. (R. 17-
18). The doctor testified that he thought the condition 
would be cured within a month or two and that he had no 
reason, at that time, to suspect a herniated disc at the C-
5, C-6 level. (R. 18, 59). The plaintiff left the emergency 
room with the impression that he was not seriously hurt. (R. 
123). Accordingly, the plaintiff arranged for substitute 
transportation that evening and returned to work the following 
day. (R. 123). 
Mr. Campbell telephoned Mr. Lavell Brown, the State 
Farm adjuster on September 12, 1973, to make arrangements 
-31-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for transportation during the interim period while he was 
without a vehicle. (R. 125). During that phone conversa-
tion, Mr. Campbell indicated to Mr. Brown that he had 
incurred only minor injuries in the accident. (Ex. 23, 
p.3). Mr. Brown then reported to his superiors that the 
injuries received by Mr. Campbell consisted of only "multiple 
bruises." (T. 68, Ex. 24, 25). 
Mr. Campbell went to see Dr. Gorishek again on 
September 19, 1973. The doctor noted that his condition 
was "still about the same: soreness in the neck, mostly on 
the left." (T. 18). The doctor stated that he did not 
change his diagnosis of cervical strain or have any reason 
to suspect any additional injury than that observed on 
September 9, 1973, the day of the accident. (T. 18). 
Accordingly, in response to Mr. Campbell's inquiry as to the 
seriousness of his injuries, the doctor stated that the 
healing "would take a little time, maybe a month or two". 
(T. 124). 
The doctor summarized his perception at this time by 
stating that he knew Mr. Campbell had an injury to his neck, 
but at that time, the exact nature of the injury was unknown 
to him. (T. 60 ). 
The appellant tries to draw some significance from the 
fact that Mr. Campbell continued to experience pain and 
discomfort. The respondent fails to see the significance of 
these facts. Dr. Gorishek had indicated to Mr. Campbell 
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that he could expect to experience one to two months of 
discomfort while the cervical strain healed. The fact still 
stands that Mr. Campbell had absolutely no understanding 
that the continued pain over the one to two months would 
mean anything more than the existence and healing of cer-
vical strain. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 30-31). 
Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Campbell indicated that their 
settlement was based on the existence of a minor injury that 
would be cured within a relatively short time. (T. 101, 
126, 127, 76, 77). The parties did not enter the agreement 
on the basis of the non-existence of pain, but in the anti-
cipation that the pain would be alleviated, consistent with 
the doctor's diagnosis within one to two months. 
These facts clearly fit within the facts of Reynolds 
where Reynolds knew his neck was injured in the same manner 
but was not disabled and did not consider the injury in its 
true light at the time of the release. Reynolds, supra at 
156, 159; Carter, supra at 1006. The instant facts are 
readily distinguishable from Carter, where Mrs. Carter was 
aware she had a serious injury to her neck, was hospitalized 
for five and one-half weeks immediately after the accident 
and was aware of x-rays that indicated problems with her 
vertebral disc at c-5/6 where the fusion later took place. 
Further, in Carter, a long period of treatment, more 
than three and one-half years from the time of the release 
expired before the herniated disc developed. In Carter, the 
injury and its serious nature were known, only its prognosis 
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was mistaken. In Reynolds and in the instant case, at the 
time of the release, there was no indication of any serious 
injury and the existence of a herniated disc was unknown and 
unappreciated. The Supreme Court's use of the distinction 
to be drawn "between an unknown injury and unknown conse-
quence of a known injury" as delineated in these two cases, 
clearly support the lower courts finding of mutual mistake. 
For an analogous case, See, Ranta v. Rake, 421 P.2d 747 
(Idaho 1966). 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ENGAGE IN SUCH CONTACT AS 1-'K)UID UNEQUIVOCALLY 
INDICATE HIS INTENTION TO RATIFY THE RELEASE AND PLAINTIFF 
IS THEREFORE NOT ESTOPPED FROM RESCINDING THE RELEASE. 
The test for ratification under both state and federal 
law set out in Union Pacific Railroad Co., v. Zimmer, 87 
Cal. App. 2d 524, 197 P.2d 363 (1948): 
The fundamental test of "ratification• 
by conduct is whether releasor with full 
knowledge of material facts entitling him 
to rescind as engaged in some unequivocal 
conduct giving rise to an inference that he 
intended his conduct to amount to a 
ratification. (emphasis added). 
The general principal as stated in 66 Am.Jur. 2d, release 
§27 as follows: 
A release voidable for any reason may be 
ratified and affirmed by the subsequent 
acts of the releaser. Some unequivocal 
act must appear giving rise to an inference 
that the releasor intended his conduct to 
amount to a ratification, or that reasonable 
minds would say that by his acts he must 
have intended a ratification of release. • • • 
(emphasis added). 
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The appellant apparently contends that the acceptance of 
drafts by Mr. Campbell, and his creditors constituted such 
action as would unequivocably indicate an intention, by Mr. 
Campbell to ratify the release. The lower court, when 
considering that evidence, stated as follows: 
The Court does not feel that acceptance by the 
plaintiff of drafts in payment of medical 
expens~s and lost wages that approximately the 
same time that defendants agent received notice 
of plaintiffs intent to void the release. 
It is sufficient fact to establish unequivocal 
conduct that the plaintiff intended to ratify 
or affirm the release. The tender to return 
payment and everything transpired thereafter 
indicated an intent to void the release and 
not to affirm. (R. 505). 
The appellant, by claiming that the acceptance of monies 
from State Farm after the release was signed constituted 
ratification is premised on several fundamental flaws. 
First, the release was one which anticipated and 
required the payment of future money. 
Second, it was not until the fall of 1974 that the true 
extent and nature of Mr. Campbell's injuries were known to 
him, and it was not until the time of plaintiff's letter of 
February 14, 1974, that plaintiff understood that he might 
have right to rescind the release. The first requisite, 
therefore, of the test, i.e., "full knowledge of the material 
facts," had not been reached until after the acts pointed to 
by the defendant. Plaintiff then acted with reasonable 
dispatch to notify the defendant of his rescision. 
Third, the conduct of the defendant, taken as of whole 
does not unequivocally indicate the intention to ratify the 
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release. On February 19, 1974, a letter and cashier's check 
for $1,250.00 was sent to the defendant specifically rescinding 
the release and tendering back the face amount paid for the 
release. This conduct clearly and unequivocally indicated 
plaintiffs intention not to ratify the release. 
Further, as noted in Watson v. Buggy, 285 s.w. 2d 67, 
(Mo. 1955), 53 A.L.R. 2d 743 and Later Case Service, and as 
summarized in the annotation itself: "in the majority of 
cases a tender back made before the commencement of the 
action on the claim release has been held timely, even 
though a considerable period of time may have elapsed between 
the execution of the release and the offer to return the 
consideration received." 53 A.L.R. 2d 743 at 769, Section 3 
( 7). 
The Court should also take notice of the fact that the 
appellant was not subject to any prejudice or induced into 
any reliance because of the negotiation of drafts by the 
respondent. The respondent tendered back all monies paid by 
the appellant and fulfilled his duty of notifying the releasee 
with reasonable dispatch. The facts seem clear that the 
plaintiff did not, by unequivocal conduct, affirm or ratify 
the release, but on the contrary, conducted himself at all 
times in a manner consistent with his notice of rejection, 
termination and rescission. (R. 525). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED INTEREST ON THE 
SPECIAL DAMAGES AWARD IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
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Utah law as codified in 78-27-44 U.C.A., 1953, allows a 
plaintiff who recovers special damages for personal injury 
to make further recovery of interest at 8% on said special 
damages. In the instant case, the Court followed the above 
cited statute and allowed respondent to recover interest at 
8% on the award of special damages. 
The specific issue before this Court as to the manner 
of applying 78-27-44 U.C.A., 1953, is whether this procedural 
matter may be applied retrospectively to allow interest on 
claims whose judgments are rendered subsequent to the effective 
date of the statute, but whose underlying cause of action 
arose prior to the effective date of the statute. The issue 
cannot be generalized so as to be simply a question of 
prospective or retrospective application of any statute, 
procedural or substantive. 
In the instant case, the cause of action arose September 
9, 1973, and the judgment upon the claim was rendered March 
10, 1978. Respondent contends that the court did make a 
correct application of the statute because the judgment was 
rendered nearly three years after the May 13, 1975, effective 
date of the statute, and because the matter of interest is 
clearly procedural, not substantive. 
The governing section, 78-27-44, U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended), reads as follows: 
In all actions brought to recover damages 
for personal injuries sustained.by any 
person, resulting from or occas1on7d by the 
tort of any other person, corporation, 
association or partnership, whether by neg-
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arises and the Oklahoma state begins at the commencement of 
the action. Neither of these differences has any bearing on 
the issue herein. 
In Fields, supra, the suit was commenced March 29, 1971, 
(the statutory time for the beginning of interest accrual) 
but the statute was not approved until June 16, 1971. A 
verdict was returned in July 6, 1973, and the trial court 
refused to add interest. 
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the 
trial court should have added interest to the judgment. The 
court's reasoning was based on the fact that because the 
statutory imposition of interest on a judgment is: 
Procedural rather than substantive, [itl 
directs allowance of interest on judgments 
from the time the suit commenced to the 
date of the verdict, notwithstanding that 
the suit was commenced prior to the effective 
date of the legislation. Fields, supra, at 
63. 
The Fields case was based on a preceding Oklahoma 
Supreme Court decision in Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 
(Okla. 1973). 
The court in Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 (Okla. 
1973) answered the question as to the retrospective appli-
cation of the statute awarding interest on special damage 
judgments by stating: 
we think that there is retrospective appli-
cation of the 6% interest matter. That 
the le~islature may, in its discretion, 
establish interest that will accrue on a 
judgment, is, of course, recognized. Sunray 
ox Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., supra, 
That the "interest" here has the effect of 
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damages does not affect the matter. Like 
costs, interest is recoverable by statute 
(Baldwin v. Collins, (Okl. 1970), 479 P.2d 
~67), an? the legislature has so prescribed 
it. It is attached by legislative fiat 
(Foster v. Quigley, (1962), 94 R.I. 217, 
179 A.2d 494--a retrospective interest case 
and here) and is proper. Not being of the ' 
substance of the cause of action (Foster v. 
Quigley, supra), but being a directive to 
the trial court, then it becomes a mode of 
procedure which the court was bound to follow. 
Since judgments bear interest as prescribed by 
12 P.S. 1971, S727, subd. 2. although the 
judgments made no provision therefor, and it 
being a ministerial duty to award interest~ 
on a judgment may be corrected by this court 
on appeal even though the error was not raised 
in the motion for new trial or petition in error. 
(Emphasis added). 
Benson, supra at 1365. 
Other jurisdictions support the above view on the appli-
cation of interest. 
In a case dealing with interest on refunds of tax 
franchise payments, the California Supreme Court in 
People of the State of California v. Union Oil Company of 
California, 310 P.2d 409 (1957), held: 
"A statutory interest right for a particular 
period depends upon the law in effect at 
that time . • • Accordingly, plaintiff 
concedes defendant's right to the interest 
on over payments for the period prior to July 
10 1947, the effective date of the amend-
me~t." (See page 412). (Emphasis added). 
For other cases holding similarly see: Ballog v. Knight 
Newspapers Inc., (1969), 381 Mich. 527, 164 N.W. 2d 19, M.E. 
Trapp Association v. Tankersly 206 Okl. 118, 240 P.2d 1091. 
( 1941). 
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The above stated rule is based on the theory that a 
procedural or ministerial aspect of the law does not induce 
parties to rely on it to their detriment. 
The substantive laws do induce detrimental reliance by 
the public. This rule has been stated by this Court as 
follows: 
In Re 
( 1944). 
The rule mentioned is founded on the 
theory that since every citizen is 
presumed to be acquainted with the law 
and to enter into his business trans-
act ions accordingly, it would be unjust 
to permit such legislation to operate 
retrospectively without a clear statment 
of the legislature that such was its purpose. 
Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d 340, 342 
An example will illustrate that as a practical and 
theoretical matter the procedural-substantive distinction 
holds true. 
If the substantive law with regard to the standard of 
care regarding supervision of school physical activities for 
the students were to be changed and applied retrospectively 
it would be grossly unfair to schools because they had no 
opportunity to escalate their level of supervision to match 
the standard of care imposed by law. The opposite is true 
with regard to the procedural application of interest. The 
changing of the law to award interest on judgments will 
produce no hardship upon the schools in one example. If the 
schools are meeting their standard of care there will be no 
interest imposed because there will be no judgment. Interest 
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would have to be astronomical in order to cause the school 
to fear a judgment against them enough to supervise under 
the standard of care. 
There is a strong argument that even if the procedural-
substan ti ve distinction had not been made by the Court, the 
statute could still be applied retrospectively on another 
ground -that of legislative intent. 
The Benson case, supra, formulated the issue in terms 
of intent (though they never expounded on this point) saying: 
(The) question, then, is whether there is 
••• intent, clearly expressed, or necessarily 
implied from the language used that requires 
retrospective application of the 6% interest 
matter, (at 1365) 
and then held that it did apply retrospectively. The statute 
construed in Benson, like the Utah statute construed herein, 
allowed interest going back to a time long before judgment 
would be rendered, i.e., to the time the cause of action 
arose (78-27-44 UCA, 1953) and to the time of commencement 
of the action (12 o.s. 1971, § 727) subd. 2). The statutes 
did not limit the interest to a time commencing with the 
effective date of the statute. 
It appears then that the legislature intended the 
interest provision to be applied retroactively, otherwise, 
the legislature would not have expressly allowed interest 
bank to the date the cause of action arose instead of the 
effective date of the statute. 
The cases cited by appellant inapposite to the issue of 
interest on special damages. 
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Appellant has cited In Re Ingraham's Estate, supra, 
for the proposition that any legislative enactment operates 
prospectively only unless expressly declared otherwise. The 
case does not deal with interest. In Ingraham, supra, however, 
this court found that there is a distinction between procedural 
and substantive changes in the law and the time for their 
applicability. The court said: 
Appellant recognizes this statute and also 
the general rule that legislative enactments 
operate prospectively rather than retro-
spectively, unless expressly declared other-
wise. However, appellant urges that the 
amendment in question (Sec. 80-12-7 Laws of 
Otah 1943) does not come within the bounds of 
the general rule stated for the reason that 
the amendment is an enactment making only 
procedural changes. We are convinced that 
the general rule must apply as Sect. 80-12-7, 
Laws of Utah 1943, is not a procedural enact-
ment, but is substantive in its effect. 
(at 341). 
The general rule was applied above only because the 
statute was found to be substantive. Procedural statutes, 
as set forth above, may be applied retroactively. 
The McCarrey v. Otah State Teachers Retirement Board, 
177 P.2d 725 (Otah, 1947) cited by appellant does not deal 
with the question of statutorily mandated interest on judgments. 
The change of law in McCarrey, supra was with regard to the 
definition and computation of years of teaching service for 
purposes of retirement and was so clearly substantive that 
there was no attempt to make the procedural-substantive 
distinction by either the attorneys or the Court. Hence, 
the broad language used by the court. 
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Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 
101, 329 P.2d 398 (1948), cited by appellant does not deal 
with the question of statutorily mandated interest on 
judgments. It deals with the substantive law of corporate 
powers and ultra vires acts. It is necessary to point out 
again that the case is not good law with regard to a 
question not considered, that is, retrospective application 
of a procedural statute. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that the judge 
was duty bound to award interest because the statute in 
effect at the time of judgment mandated the imposition of 
interest on special damages given in a judgment. Appellant 
cannot be said to have relied on this procedural aspect of 
the law and hence there is no equitable reason to eliminate 
interest charged to appellant. More importantly, the law is 
clear that there is a distinction between retrospective 
application of procedural and substantive law, and interest 
is a procedural matter which may be applied retrospectively. 
CONCLUSION 
The two trial judges who heard this case properly 
determined that State Farm Automobile Insurance Company is 
not an indispensable party to this action. 
The Court determined, upon the clear weight of evidence, 
that there was a mutual mistake of fact between Mr. Campbell 
and Mr. Brown. The facts reveal that at the time the release 
was executed, the exact nature of the injury was not known 
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to either of the parties. The plaintiff by his conduct did 
not unequivocally ratify the release but, on the contrary, 
acted with due diligence to rescind the release agreement 
and tender back to the appellant and her insurance company 
the money paid under the release. 
The trial court decision to allow interest on special 
damages was proper in that the statute was procedural and 
therefore applicable to the judgment in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this {{fr__ day of October, 1978. 
~~~c.rc:/ J~ON HOWARD,~ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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